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Abstract—The widespread adoption of continuously
connected smartphones and tablets developed the us-
age of mobile applications, among which many use
location to provide geolocated services. These services
provide new prospects for users: getting directions to
work in the morning, leaving a check-in at a restaurant
at noon and checking next day’s weather in the evening
are possible right from any mobile device embedding
a GPS chip. In these location-based applications, the
user’s location is sent to a server, which uses them to
provide contextual and personalised answers. However,
nothing prevents the latter from gathering, analysing
and possibly sharing the collected information, which
opens the door to many privacy threats. Indeed, mobil-
ity data can reveal sensitive information about users,
among which one’s home, work place or even reli-
gious and political preferences. For this reason, many
privacy-preserving mechanisms have been proposed
these last years to enhance location privacy while using
geolocated services. This article surveys and organises
contributions in this area from classical building blocks
to the most recent developments of privacy threats and
location privacy-preserving mechanisms. We divide the
protection mechanisms between online and offline use
cases, and organise them into six categories depending
on the nature of their algorithm. Moreover, this article
surveys the evaluation metrics used to assess protection
mechanisms in terms of privacy, utility and perfor-
mance. Finally, open challenges and new directions to
address the problem of computational location privacy
are pointed out and discussed.
I. Introduction
More and more users are carrying a handheld device
such as a smartphone or a tablet and using it to access
a wide variety of services on the go. Using these services,
users can consult their bank accounts’ balance from any-
where, book a table in a restaurant at any moment, track
the status of their flight in real time or get a notification
when their friends are nearby. This is possible thanks to
the wide range of sensors available on these devices, giving
them access to some knowledge about their environment.
They are able to determine their location in real time
and then use it to interact with geolocated services, often
called Location-Based Services (LBSs for short). These
*This paper is to appear in IEEE Communications Surveys &
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services provide a contextual and personalised information
depending on the current user’s location. A multitude of
LBSs have emerged these last years. We give here a non-
exhaustive list of common usages that have been enabled
by the rise of LBSs.
• Directions & navigation applications: These services
allow users to get directions to (almost) any desti-
nation, and then to navigate towards it by simply
following spoken instructions. Location data is used to
provide real-time directions, recalculated as the user
is moving. Well-known players here include Google
Maps [1] and Waze [2].
• Weather applications: These services provide current
weather conditions as well as forecasts. Location data
is used to give the user relevant information for the
city he is currently located in. Yahoo! Weather [3] is
an application providing such a service on Android
and iOS.
• Venue finders: These services give users information
about interesting places in their vicinity. Most of the
time, they include recommendations based on the
experience of other users. Location data is used to
show only places in immediate user’s neighbourhood.
Foursquare [4] and Yelp [5] are two applications help-
ing to find such interesting places, with an added
social dimension.
• Social games: These services turn any urban walk
into an ever-changing game, where each new place
becomes a new playground. Location data is used to
make the game evolve depending on the user’s city
and his immediate surroundings, sometimes allowing
to compete with nearby other users. Examples of such
games are Pokemon GO [6] and City Domination [7].
• Crowd-sensing applications: These services enable
participatory sensing, where a crowd of users use
their smartphones to monitor their environment and
share their results through an LBS server. Crowd-
sensing benefits to a large variety of domains such as
smart cities (e.g., the traffic monitoring application
Nericell [8]) or health monitoring (e.g., PEIR [9]).
APISENSE [10] and Funf [11] are two applications
allowing to run crowd-sensing campaigns.
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Fig. 1: Depending on the use case (i.e., real-time, batch, or offline), an LPPM can operate on location data during the
collection or the publication phase.
Whatever their exact nature these services require users
to disclose their location in order to make the application
working as expected. This location disclosure nevertheless
causes loss of control from users on their privacy and
consequently allows LBSs to store the mobility and all
places users are visiting over time. The sequence of all
locations known to belong to a single user, along with the
time at which the user was seen at each location, is called
a mobility trace. Users are often not aware of the quantity
of sensitive knowledge that can be inferred from their
mobility traces. Analysing mobility traces of users can
reveal their points of interest [12], which are meaningful
places such as home or work. It can also reveal the other
users they frequently meet [13], or lead to predicting their
future mobility [14]. By combining mobility traces with
semantic information [15], it is also possible to infer the
actual user’s activity (e.g., working, shopping, watching
a film) or its transportation mode if the user is on the
move. Besides the continuous tracking of a user’s activities,
points of interest can lead to leak even more sensitive
information such as religious, political or sexual beliefs
if one regularly goes to the headquarters of a political
party, a worship place or a lesbian bar, respectively. As
an example, it is possible to find out which taxi drivers
are Muslim by correlating the time at which they are in
pause with mandatory prayer times [16].
Needless to say, this large amount of mobility data is a
gold mine for many companies willing to learn more infor-
mation about users. The market related to LBSs is indeed
enormous: the total revenue of the US-only LBS industry
was already estimated to $75 billion in 2012 [17]. This
high value of the mobility data leads many applications
and companies to commercially exploit the collected data
for analysis, profiling, marketing, behavioural targeting, or
simply to sell this information to external parties. More-
over, the location of users is tracked and collected by many
mobile applications with and without their consent [18],
[19], [20], [21], [22], which aggravates the privacy threats
related to sharing mobility data, voluntarily or not.
To mitigate these privacy problems, many location pri-
vacy protection mechanisms (LPPMs for short, or just
protection mechanisms in this article) have been proposed
in the literature. Their goal is to protect location privacy of
users while still allowing them to enjoy geolocated services.
There is a rich literature about existing LPPMs. Some
of them are rather generic and can adapt to a lot of
situations while others are very specific to a single use case.
LPPMs rely on a wide array of techniques, ranging from
data perturbation (e.g., [23], [24], [25]) to data encryption
(e.g., [26], [27], [28]), and including fake data generation
(e.g., [29], [30], [31]). In this survey, we distinguish between
three classes of use cases for LPPMs as illustrated in
Figure 1.
In real-time use cases, users query an LBS and expect an
immediate answer. We include in this category the usage
of navigation applications, weather applications, venue
finders and social games. The main challenge for real-time
LPPMs (e.g., [23], [24], [28]) is that they only have at their
disposal actual and historical locations; they obviously do
not know the future state of the system.
Offline use cases come into play once an LBS has
collected mobility data and wants to publish it, whether
it is for commercial or non-profit purposes (e.g., sharing
mobility data with a marketing company or to release
a dataset as open data). Instead of protecting locations
on-the-fly, offline LPPMs (e.g., [32], [33], [34]) protect
whole mobility datasets at once, possibly leveraging the
knowledge of the behaviour of all users in the system to
apply more efficient and subtle schemes.
In batch use cases, users regularly send their data to
an LBS (e.g., every hour) and expect it to publish back
aggregated results. This use case is typically adopted by
crowd-sensing applications [35] and is a middle-ground
situation between real-time and offline use cases. Batch
LPPMs differ from real-time LPPMs in that they are less
sensitive to latency, and they send more data at once. They
also differ from offline LPPMs because they do not have
the global knowledge.
Figure 1 depicts an overview of the three aforementioned
uses cases as well as the involved entities. As shown, we
distinguish between two phases when using an LPPM:
what happens online during the collection, i.e., between
a user and an LBS, and what happens offline, during
the publication, i.e., between an LBS and an analyst.
Depending on their nature, LBSs fall either in the real-
time or batch use cases. Furthermore, offline use cases
appear as soon as one of these LBSs is willing to publish
and to protect the gathered mobility data.
Protecting mobility data with an LPPM obviously im-
proves the privacy but also impacts the quality of the
resulting data. To evaluate LPPMs and to compare them
together, researchers have proposed a large variety of
metrics. These metrics can be divided in three categories.
Privacy metrics quantify the level of privacy a user can
expect while using a given LPPM. One popular way to
evaluate privacy is to evaluate the effect of a privacy attack
while being protected by an LPPM (e.g., [36]). Utility met-
rics measure the usefulness (also called quality of service)
that can still be obtained while using an LPPM, which
largely depends on the targeted LBS and the considered
use case. There is an inherent trade-off between privacy
and utility. Indeed, if no mobility data is sent, privacy is
perfectly preserved, while the utility is null. Conversely,
sending unprotected data results in a perfect utility at the
cost of no privacy. Finally, performance metrics measure
the algorithm efficiency or the cost of a given LPPM.
Typical performance metrics are the execution time, the
ability to scale or the tolerance to faults. Performance met-
rics are orthogonal and do not participate to the privacy
and utility trade-off, but still are important because they
impact the usability of LPPMs.
With the advent of pervasive computing offering new
possibilities for tracking and collecting the location and
the mobility of users, computational location privacy has
become essential. We are only interested in computational
location privacy, i.e., in threats and countermeasures per-
formed by algorithms. This survey is not related to non-
computational threats, which would for example come
from a manual inspection and reasoning on mobility data,
performed by a human brain. Computational location
privacy has already been reviewed in several surveys.
While both Krumm [37] and Shin et al. [38] published
general surveys, Terrovitis [39] and Wernke et al. [40]
followed an approach focused on location privacy attacks,
and Chow et al. [41] focus on online LPPMs. However, only
few of these articles address the evaluation of protection
mechanisms, and when it is actually discussed, only pri-
vacy is considered without the complementary utility and
performance metrics. Moreover, previous surveys often
focus either on the online or the offline scenario but not
both. In the context of Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs),
Grissa and al. [42] provide a comprehensive survey that
investigates the various location privacy risks and threats
as well, as countermeasures that have been proposed in
the literature to cope with these location privacy issues.
Lastly, Cottrill [43] uses a multidisciplinary approach to
discuss location privacy and to ensure that the protection
of private information is directly addressed from each of
the relevant standpoints of law, policy, and technology.
In this survey, we provide an up-to-date vision over
computational location privacy, including recent works
like differentially private approaches [23] or privacy-by-
design LBS architectures [44]. Figure 2 depicts the dif-
ferent areas covered by our survey. We review practical
privacy attacks on mobility data, and survey state-of-
the-art protection mechanisms. As presented in Figure 2,
we organise LPPMs into three use cases (i.e., real-time,
batch, or offline), and into six categories depending on the
kind of algorithm (i.e., mix-zones, generalization-based,
dummies-based, perturbation-based, protocol-based and
rule-based). We furthermore discuss the evaluation of
LPPMs with privacy, utility, and performance metrics,
and report how the presented protection mechanisms have
been evaluated by their authors. We also consider their
architecture and associated impacts (e.g., added latency
or integrability). Lastly, from the lessons we learned from
our experience, we discuss open challenges and emerging
visions in computation location privacy.
In this survey, we do not consider protection mech-
anisms only using anonymity, also called pseudonymity.
These solutions consist in removing the link between an
individual and its data by using a pseudonym instead of his
real identity. Indeed, only relying on pseudonymization to
protect data is not enough and this practice has resulted in
several well-known privacy breaches these last years. (e.g.,
the identification of the governor of Massachusetts in an
"anonymised" health dataset [45] or the re-identification
of users from AOL web search logs [46] or a Netflix
dataset [47]).
The remainder of this survey is structured as follows. We
present in Section II the practical threats associated with
location disclosure, before reviewing the evaluation met-
rics used to assess LPPMs in Section III. We present the
different architectures adopted by LPPMs in Section IV.
We then survey state-of-the-art protection mechanisms in
Section V. We finally present some open challenges in
Section VI before concluding in Section VII.
II. Privacy threats
Although LBSs potentially provide useful services, users
are not always aware of the risks associated with the
disclosure of their location during their daily life. For
instance, the goal of the website Please Rob Me [48] is to
"raise awareness about over-sharing". They use geolocated
tweets to infer whether a user is at home or not, and hence
if the way is free for potential thieves. In this section, we
present the most important considered adversary models
and the main practical threats for a user related to the
exploitation of her mobility traces.
Fig. 2: Our survey reviews practical threats associated with location disclosure and surveys state-of-the-art LPPMs
over different use cases (i.e., protecting data in real-time, operating by batches, or offline). LPPMs are structured in
six categories and can adopt different architectures. We also detail their evaluation in terms of privacy and utility, as
well as performance.
A. Adversary models
An adversary is anyone who can have an access to mobil-
ity data of one or several users. According to Figure 1, the
adversary can be either the LBS itself or a data scientist
who gets a dataset after it was published. In most of
the cases, the adversary is considered to be honest-but-
curious [49]. This means that the data scientist or the LBS
behaves correctly (i.e., it provides the expected service)
but it may exploit in all possible ways the information it
receives. In particular, we assume that the adversary has
access to any database containing additional information
about the semantic of places or the associated activities,
the topology of the road network, details about the public
transportation lines (e.g., map, timetables), and so on. In
addition, we also assume that the adversary may be able to
collect external knowledge about each user in the system,
modelled as a set of past mobility data. For instance,
it can be used to run state-of-the-art re-identification
attacks in order to re-associate the received data to a
known user, or to predict future mobility. Moreover, it is
also assumed that the LBS may identify that the client
is relying on a LPPM while communicating with it. In
some cases, it is further assumed that the adversary may
collude with the proxy (i.e., typically when the proxy is
not trusted) or different nodes in the system (e.g., using a
Sybil attack [50]) in order to learn more information about
the users.
B. Points of interest & semantics
Points of interest (POIs for short) are spatially delim-
ited places where users spend some time. POIs can be
home or work places, but also a swimming pool, a school
or a cinema for instance. But they can also be even more
sensitive places like a religious monument where a user
regularly goes, the headquarters of a political party he
is involved in or a hospital he is cured in. They can be
extracted from mobility traces quite easily by using simple
clustering algorithms like the ones presented in [51], [52].
Figure 3 shows an example of the behaviour of such an
algorithm designed to extract POIs. Using APIs such as
the Google Places [53] for instance can also provide details
about each POI such as its precise address, the associated
activity or the shops located at this location.
Fig. 3: Three POIs have been extracted from this mobility
trace by using a clustering algorithm.
Gambs et al. [12] made an attack on a dataset containing
mobility traces of taxi drivers in the San Francisco Bay
Area. By finding points where the taxi’s GPS sensor was
off for a long period of time (e.g. 2 hours), they were
able to infer POIs of the drivers. In some cases, they
were able to locate a home and even to confirm it by
using a satellite view of the area showing the presence
of a yellow cab parked in front of the supposed driver’s
home. It was possible to infer a plausible home in a small
neighbourhood for 20 out of 90 mobility traces analysed.
Deneau [16] created a visualisation tool to analyse the
active and inactive periods of taxi drivers over the day.
By correlating their time of inactivity with the five times
of prayer per day observed by practising Muslims, it was
possible to identify drivers that could be Muslims.
The new development of machine learning brings huge
security risks on location privacy. For instance, machine
learning has showed his effectiveness to learn the semantics
of some place. Krumm introduced Placer [15], a system
using machine learning to automatically label places into
14 categories (home, work, shopping, transportation, place
of worship, etc.). Author reported an overall accuracy of
73 %, mostly thanks to home and work places which are
the easiest ones to label because this is where people spend
most of their time. Riederer et al. developed FindYou [54],
which aims to raise user awareness on the privacy issues
surrounding the collection and use of location data. Find-
You allow users to import their own location data from
popular social networks and audit them. By leveraging the
knowledge provided by the US Census Bureau and unsu-
pervised machine learning methods, this personal location
privacy auditing tool provides prediction on the home
place of users as well as their age, income and ethnicity.
Huguenin et al. [55] leveraged machine learning to infer the
motivation (e.g., "Inform about activity", "Share mood" or
"Wish people to join me") behind check-ins of users on
Foursquare. They achieved up to 63 % of accuracy when
predicting a coarse-grained motivation.
C. Social relationships
With several mobility traces, it is possible to compare
them and infer relationships between users. The idea is
very simple: if two (or more) persons spend some time
within the same area at the same moment, they are likely
to be related by some social link. Bilogrevic et al. [56]
studied this threat by using malicious Wi-Fi access points
deployed on the EPFL campus (in Switzerland) that
were able to locate devices communicating with them. By
setting appropriate thresholds, they could detect meetings
between people. Then, they used training data to get
a characterisation of the social link between students,
thus finding out if they were classmates, friends or other
depending on the place where they met and the time they
spent together. With the optimal experimental parame-
ters, the authors experimentally obtained a true positives
rate of 60 % and a false positives rate of 20 %. Similarly,
Wang et al. [57] studied how access points could infer social
relationships between users. They designed a decision tree
classifying relationships by using the interaction time, in-
ferred activity type (i.e., home, work, leisure) and physical
closeness of people. Their classifier exhibits a success rate
above 85 %.
D. Re-identification
Mobility traces can ultimately lead to re-identifying
physical users, i.e., associating an identity to each trace.
Krumm [58] used two months of mobility traces and tried
to infer users’ home address with various heuristics. By us-
ing white pages, it was possible in some cases to associate
a person to a mobility trace. The most accurate heuristic
gave 9 correct re-identifications out of 172 drivers. Gambs
et al. [59] proposed a re-identification approach based on
mobility Markov chains. They are used to model mobility
patterns of users, more specifically the transitions between
POIs. They designed different distance measures to quan-
tify the similarity between two Markov chains and used
them to re-identify users. They achieved up to 45 % of
good matching, which was significantly better than other
state-of-the-art attacks. Tockar [60] showed it was possible
to stalk at celebrities by using a taxi trips dataset and
some specifically crafted queries. By extracting drop-off
addresses of people frequently spending their night in a
club, and by using Google and Facebook to get more
information about these addresses, he was able to pinpoint
certain individuals with a high probability. Pyrgelis [61] et
al. studied the feasibility of membership inference attacks
on aggregate mobility datasets (i.e., datasets featuring how
many users where within specific regions during specific
periods of time). They modeled the problem as a game,
and trained a machine learning classifier on prior knowl-
edge and used it to infer whether particular individuals
were part of a mobility dataset. Powerful attackers reached
an Area Under Curve up to 0.83 or even 1.0, depending
on how much background knowledge they have at their
disposal.
These results are mainly possible due to the high degree
of uniqueness of human mobility. Indeed, De Montjoye et
al. [62] showed that only four randomly chosen spatio-
temporal points are sufficient to almost uniquely identify a
user hidden among the crowd. It means that the mobility
of every individual acts like a fingerprint, even among a
large number of users (they used a dataset containing 1.5
million users). In the same manner, Golle et al. [63] studied
the uniqueness of the home/work pair. When revealing the
census district where people live and work, it is possible
to uniquely identify 5% of them, and for 40% of them,
they are only hidden among 9 other people. If the census
block where they live and work is disclosed, nearly all
people can be uniquely identified. Zang et al. [64] improved
the previous study by considering top-N locations of a
large set of call data records of a US nation-wide cell
operator. With the most precise location that can be
grabbed from these records, which is the sector where the
person stands, it is possible to uniquely identify 35% of
the users by using their top-two locations and 85% of them
by using their top-three locations. We also demonstrated
the highly unique nature of mobility traces from different
sensors [65]. Among other observations, authors noticed
that the temporal dimension is as discriminative as the
spatial dimension and that the uniqueness degree of mobil-
ity traces is user-dependent. They also pointed out that it
is still possible to re-identify users with a high success rate
using an appropriate attack even if the data was protected
by classical LPPMs. Manousakas et al. [66] showed it
might be even worse, as even if removing all spatial and
temporal information from the graph of visited places,
the topology of the latter graph is itself often uniquely
identifying. They evaluated their approach with a dataset
of 1500 users and found out that about 60 % of the users
are uniquely identifiable from their top-10 locations, and
this percentage increases to 93 % in the case of a directed
graph. With a directed graph, 19 locations are needed to
uniquely identify each of the 1500 users.
Recently, Wang et al. [67] explored the discrepancies be-
tween the theory and practice of re-identification attacks.
They leveraged a large ground-truth dataset containing 2
million users, and two smaller external datasets collected
over the same population to match against the former.
They first evaluated seven state-of-the-art algorithms,
showing that with those datasets, the best performing ones
only achieved a re-identification rate of 20 %, which is far
from the theoretical bound announced by De Montjoye [62]
and others. By further analysing the results, it appeared
that there was large spatio-temporal mismatches, whose
effect was underestimated. Finally, they proposed four new
re-identification attacks addressing the previously men-
tioned concerns, improving the re-identification of 17 %
as compared to previous state-of-the-art algorithms.
E. Future mobility prediction
Knowing past mobility of a user can help to model his
habits and hence allow to predict where he will be in
a future time. Noulas et al. [68] focused on Foursquare
check-ins. They extracted features from users mobility
and used machine learning algorithms to predict places
where users were likely to leave the next check-in. Precision
was maximal during morning and at noon, when they
achieved an accuracy of 65 %. It was harder to predict
the next check-in in the night, during which accuracy
dropped to 50 %. Sadilek and Krumm [14] proposed Far
Out, a system to predict the location of a user in the long
term, i.e., in a far away future date and within a time
window of one hour. They leveraged Fourier analysis and
principal component analysis to extract repetitive patterns
from mobility data. These patterns were associated to a
week day and a hour in the day. Their system featured
an accuracy in their predictions ranging from 77 % to
93 %. Another threat coming from the analysis of mobility
traces is the inference of users’ mobility patterns. Gambs
et al. [69] modelled movement habits of people by using
Markov chains. Each frequent POI becomes a state in
the chain and a probability is assigned to each possible
transition. They split the day into several temporal slices
and differentiated between week days and week-ends. With
a dataset spanning over a sufficient period of time, it
became possible to predict future users’ movements. Agir
et al.[70] studied the prediction of the next check-in of
users by using Bayesian networks. They evaluated their
approach with data of 1065 users, collected from tweets
that have been generated from Foursquare. Across 6 major
cities, the median accuracy when predicting the next
check-in is between 100 and 150 metres. The authors also
studied the impact of semantic information on this kind of
attack. They found out that by incorporating semantics,
the median accuracy of their predictions decreased by 10
to 115 metres.
III. Evaluating LPPMs
Unfortunately, there is no standard to evaluate and com-
pare LPPMs. To the best of our knowledge, only the work
of Shokri et al. [36] focuses on the evaluation of LPPMs.
Although it is only interested in quantifying privacy, it
defines solid foundations towards building a complete eval-
uation methodology. In this section, we review the different
evaluation metrics used in the literature to assess LPPMs
in a quantitative manner. We start by introducing two
classical privacy notions in Section III-A. We then group
and present evaluation metrics through three complemen-
tary categories, namely privacy metrics in Section III-B,
utility metrics in Section III-C and performance metrics in
Section III-D. We discuss the inherent trade-off between
privacy and utility in Section III-E. We conclude this
section by surveying mobility datasets commonly used to
conduct practical evaluations in Section III-F.
A. Privacy models
Two general privacy models have emerged and have
been widely adopted by the community, and are still
the foundation for most of subsequent works [71]. Those
models propose generic privacy guarantees that were orig-
inally not specific to location privacy, but have been later
successfully applied to location privacy. In this subsection
(and only this one), the concept of dataset is not limited
to mobility datasets but to generic datasets, i.e., a list of
records with attributes.
1) k-anonymity: The model of k-anonymity has been
introduced by Sweeney in 2002 [45]. The idea is to pre-
vent one to uniquely identify individuals from a small
subset of their attributes, called a quasi-identifier. The
subset of attributes to protect, which is not part of the
quasi-identifier, form the sensitive attributes. For instance,
within medical records, the birth date, sex and zip code
triplet is a quasi-identifier that is enough to uniquely
identify some individuals, while the disease is a sensitive
attribute. k-anonymity states that to be protected, a user
must be indistinguishable among at least k−1 other users.
To achieve that, all k indistinguishable users must have the
same values for all attributes forming their quasi-identifier.
This makes them look similar and forms what is called an
anonymity group. Therefore, the probability of an attacker
without external knowledge to re-identify someone among
k similar users is at most 1/k.
Definition 1: Let d be a sequence of records with n
attributes a1, ..., an and Qd = {ai, ..., aj} ⊆ {a1, ..., an} be
the quasi-identifier associated with d. Let dk be the k-th
record of d and r[Qd] the projection of record r ∈ d on Qd,
i.e., the |Qd|-tuple formed of values for only the attributes
of Qd in r. d is said to satisfy k-anonymity if and only
if each unique sequence of values in the quasi-identifier
appears with at least k occurrences in d, or formally:
∀s ∈ {r[Qd] | r ∈ d}, |{i ∈ N | di[Qd] = s}| ≥ k
TABLE I: A dataset with k-anonymity where k = 2.
Birth Sex Zip Disease
1970 M 0247 Migraine
1970 M 0247 Chest pain
1970 F 0247 Asthma
1970 F 0247 Migraine
1970 F 0247 Asthma
1969 M 0232 Appendicitis
1969 M 0232 Appendicitis
For example, Table I shows a sample of a medical
dataset exposing a k-anonymity guarantee, where the
quasi-identifier is {Birth, Sex, Zip} and the sensitive at-
tributes are {Disease}, for k = 2. Here, there are three
unique {Birth, Sex, Zip} triplets, i.e., 〈1970,M, 0247〉,
〈1970, F, 0247〉 and 〈1969,M, 0232〉. For each of those
triplets, there are respectively two, three and two different
records. Consequently, there is a minimum of two different
records for each triplet of values taken by the quasi-
identifier: this table guarantees 2-anonymity. This way,
knowing the birth year, sex and zip code of some individual
should not leak his disease, as there is at least one other
person with the same quasi-identifier.
However, despite providing 2-anonymity, there is a prob-
lem in Table I for male patients born in 1969 and living in
the area with 0232 zip code (i.e., the last two records).
Indeed, they share the same value for their sensitive
attribute (i.e., they have the same disease), which leaves
them unprotected. This concern has been addressed by the
introduction of `-diversity [72]. It extends k-anonymity by
additionally enforcing that within anonymity groups, there
should be at least ` well-represented values. More precisely,
it enforces a particular distribution of values for sensi-
tive attributes across each anonymity group. This well-
represented notion is formally defined in three different
ways in [72]. The simplest one is called distinct `-diversity
and states that there must be at least ` distinct values for
each sensitive field for each anonymity group.
t-closeness [73] is a further extension of `-diversity In-
stead of just guaranteeing a good representation of sen-
sitive values, this approach enforces that the distribution
of every sensitive attribute inside anonymity groups must
be the same than the distribution of this attribute in the
whole dataset, modulo a threshold t.
2) Differential privacy: Differential privacy is a more
recent model introduced by Dwork [74] defining a for-
mal and provable privacy guarantee. The idea is that
an aggregate result computed over a dataset should be
almost the same whether or not a single element is present
inside the dataset. In other words, the addition or removal
of one single element shall not change significantly the
probability of any outcome of an aggregate function.
Unlike k-anonymity, the differential privacy definition is
not affected by the external knowledge an attacker may
have.
Definition 2: Let  ∈ R+∗ and K be a randomized
function that takes a dataset as input. Let image(K) be
the image of K. K gives -differential privacy if for all
datasets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and
for all S ⊆ image(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr[K(D2) ∈ S]
For example, Table II shows two versions of a sample
dataset listing whether individuals are subject to chronic
migraines. Let us suppose that an analyst has access to
these two datasets, and to a query Q that takes a dataset
as input and returns the number of persons having chronic
migraines. By computing Q(D2) − Q(D1) = 3 − 2 = 1,
our curious analyst can infer that Joe is indeed subject to
chronic migraines.
Several methods have been proposed to practically
achieve differential privacy. We present one of them, called
the Laplace mechanism, that can is used for numerical
values, and hence in the location privacy context. It relies
TABLE II: Two datasets differing on one single element.
Name Has chronic migraines
Agatha True
Anna False
John True
Mark False
Mary False
Name Has chronic migraines
Agatha True
Anna False
Joe True
John True
Mark False
Mary False
(a) Dataset D1, without Joe. (b) Dataset D2, with Joe.
on adding random noise, whose magnitude depends on the
sensitivity of the query function issued on the dataset.
Intuitively, the sensitivity of a query function quantifies
the impact that the addition or removal of a single element
of a dataset could have on the output of this function.
Definition 3: Let f be a function that takes a dataset
as input and produces a vector of reals, i.e., f : D −→
Rn, n ∈ N. Let D1 and D2 be two datasets differing on at
most one element. The sensitivity of f is noted ∆f and
defined, for all such datasets D1 and D2, as:
∆f = max
D1,D2
||f(D1)− f(D2)||1.
The sensitivity is defined independently of the un-
derlying data, and only depends on the function under
consideration. In particular, for queries that are counting
records (such as Q in our previous example), ∆Q = 1
because the addition or removal of a single record affects
the count result by increasing or decreasing its value by 1.
Then, the Laplace mechanism adds Laplacian noise with
mean 0 and scale parameter ∆f/ to the query’s result1.
Consequently, the -differentially privacy version of Q is
defined as Qˆ(D) = Q(D) + Y , where Y ∼ Lap(1/). That
way, computing Q(D2) − Q(D1) does not automatically
result in 1, because of the added Laplacian noise. The
Laplace mechanism is of course only suitable for queries
producing numerical results; another method exists for
categorical values [75], but it is outside of the scope of
this paper.
Differential privacy supports the composition of func-
tions, and the potential information leakage resulting
of this composition can be quantified. In the general
case, when applying n randomized independent algo-
rithms K1, ...,Kn that provide 1, ..., n-differential pri-
vacy, any composition of those algorithms provides (Σii)-
differential privacy. This is known as sequential compo-
sition. This protection model assumes that each analyst
has a global privacy budget. In an interactive mode (i.e.,
online LPPMs), each time she issues an -differentially
private query, his privacy budget is reduced by . Once
the budget is totally consumed, all subsequent queries
from this analyst should be rejected. It models the fact
that once an information is learnt, it cannot be forgotten.
In practice, determining this privacy budget and its in-
1Proof of this is provided in [74].
stantiation (global, per user, etc.) remains largely an open
question. Recent works (e.g., [76]) address this question.
Differential privacy has generated an important liter-
ature these last few years with new models and inter-
model connections [71], as well as new techniques such
as randomised response [77] and its combination with
sampling [78] which achieves zero-knowledge privacy [79]
(a privacy bound tighter than differential privacy).
B. Privacy metrics
To quantify the level of protection offered by an LPPM,
we identify three categories of privacy metrics.
• Formal guarantee metrics adopt a theoretical ap-
proach to quantify the effect of an LPPM on mobil-
ity data. They use a well-defined and unambiguous
framework to guarantee that a protected dataset has
a certain level of privacy. As of now, there are two
such guarantees commonly offered by LPPMs: k-
anonymity and differential privacy (cf. Section III-A).
k-anonymity, applied to location privacy, states that
during a given time window and inside a given area,
there should be at least k users. LPPMs then take
different approaches to enforce this guarantee, for
example by allowing users to specify the size of
these areas or time windows as parameters, or by
automatically adjusting them, such as they contain
k users. -differential privacy has been instantiated
differently by different LPPMs. Usually, instead of
protecting the presence or absence of individual users,
as it is the case with classical differential privacy,
LPPMs attempt to protect the presence or absence of
individual locations. Hence, the goal is not anymore
to hide that a user is part of a dataset, but to hide
where she went.
• Data distortion metrics compare privacy-related
properties of mobility data before and after applying
an LPPM on it. Indeed, using an LPPM is expected to
hide sensitive information that was otherwise possible
to obtain from actual mobility data. Examples of such
metrics include computing the entropy of protected
data or evaluating whether POIs can still be retrieved.
• Attack correctness metrics evaluate the impact of
a location privacy attack that could be ran by an
adversary in order to gain knowledge about users (see
Section II for the list of potential attacks). Shokri
et al. [36] did an extensive work on the usage of
attacks to quantify location privacy. They distinguish
between three axes when evaluating the effectiveness
of an attack: certainty, accuracy and correctness.
Certainty is about the ambiguity of the attack’s
result; for example there is some uncertainty if a
re-identification attack outputs three possible users,
while the uncertainty is null if the same attack out-
puts a single user (independently of whether it is
the correct answer). Accuracy is about taking into
account that the attacker does not have unlimited
computational resources; consequently, the output of
his attack may be only an approximate response, e.g.,
by only taking into account a sample of all data at his
disposal. Correctness quantifies the distance between
the attack’s result and the truth; it is what actually
quantifies location privacy. An LPPM is expected to
mitigate privacy attacks and lower (or even suppress)
their harmful effects. As opposed to data distortion
metrics, attack correctness metrics do not compare
the effect of an attack before and after applying an
LPPM, but rather evaluate directly the attack on
a protected dataset, and use the actual dataset as
ground truth to evaluate whether the attack was
successful.
Very recently, a survey has specifically focused on re-
viewing and discussing privacy metrics [80].
C. Utility metrics
To evaluate the quality of protected mobility data, we
identify two categories of utility metrics.
• Data distortion metrics compare utility-related prop-
erties of mobility before and after applying an LPPM
on it. Indeed, we expect that the LPPM will not
distort all properties of a dataset and make it un-
usable. Examples of such metrics include evaluating
the spatial and temporal imprecision and comparing
the covered area. It is of purpose that we name this
category the same way as for privacy metrics, because
they do represent the same thing, but applied on
different properties (privacy- or utility-related). If we
go even further, it happens that some data distortion
metrics are used one time as a privacy metric and the
other time as a utility metric2.
• Task distortion metrics compare the result of some
practical task on the data before and after applying an
LPPM. For instance, these metrics can be interested
in data mining tasks or analytics queries.
D. Performance metrics
Protecting mobility data can be resources greedy. To
evaluate the performance an LPPM, four categories of
metrics are commonly used.
2A common example is a metric whose goal is to compare the
distance between actual locations and protected locations. It can be
viewed either as a privacy metric, because by distorting locations we
hide where users were, or as a utility metric, if the LBS that we use
or the task that the analyst wants to run requires spatial precision.
• Execution time is a simple quantification of the time
it takes for an LPPM to protect data. Of course, it
does not have the same impact for real-time use cases,
where a response is expected in a very short time
frame (a few milliseconds, a few seconds at most),
than for batch or offline use cases that do not expect
an immediate answer. However, even for the latter,
it is of importance as computational resources have
a cost ("time is money"). This execution time can be
measured in various ways, for example in seconds or
in CPU cycles.
• Communication overhead metrics quantify the neg-
ative impact of applying an LPPM on the quantity
of information that will be produced and exchanged
through the network in online use cases. For online use
cases, some LPPMs need to exchange more messages,
or more answers are received from the LBS. Obvi-
ously, it has an impact on the execution time, but it
can be measured separately. For offline use cases it is
related to the size of the protected dataset; if bigger
or more complex that the actual one, it can slow down
the job of analysts and affect their experience when
working with the dataset.
• Energy overhead metrics measure the negative impact
on the battery lifetime implied by using a given
LPPM, when running it as an application on a mobile
device. It is important to be quantified because it
impacts the usability and adoption by end users. It
is only applicable to online LPPMs.
• Scalability measures how well an LPPM can face a
high workload. For online LPPMs, scalability metrics
are mostly related to the capability of handling a
high volume of concurrent requests, while for offline
LPPMs it concerns the ability to deal with datasets
of large sizes.
E. Trade-off between utility and privacy
Protecting mobility data by an LPPM improves the
privacy but impacts the quality of the resulting data: this
is the trade-off between privacy and utility. The more the
information is altered (e.g., modified or deleted), the less
the protected data may be exploited. The configuration of
this trade-off (i.e., defining the levels of privacy and utility
required for the protected data) closely depends on the
considered use case. For instance, a weather application
requires a less precise location (it can accommodate with
only a city name) than a navigation application (it needs
to know in which street a users is located). Consequently,
both the privacy and the utility evaluations should be
tailored to fit the actual use case.
LPPMs are usually configured through various config-
uration parameters, which greatly impact the resulting
privacy and utility, and it is an uneasy task to correctly
define LPPM configuration parameters. As an example,
Wait for Me [32] takes at least five parameters, with some
labeled as the "initial maximum radius used in clustering"
TABLE III: Common datasets of mobility traces.
Dataset Location Time span #users #events
Cabspotting San Francisco, USA 1 month 536 11 million
MDC Geneva, Switzerland 3 years 185 11 million
Privamov Lyon, France 15 months 100 156 million
Geolife Beijing, China 5,5 years 178 25 million
T-Drive Beijing, China 1 week 10,357 15 million
Brightkite Worldwide 1.5 years 58,228 4 million
Gowalla Worldwide 1.5 years 196,591 6 million
or the "global maximum trash size". While there are useful
to fine-tune the behaviour of the algorithm, we do not
expect final users to read the paper to understand what
the trash is or how the clustering works. Even the single 
parameter of geo-indistinguishability [23] is tricky to con-
figure, because it is expressed in meters−1 and its impact
is exponential. Similarly, it is difficult for a final user who
knows (usually) nothing about differential privacy to set
it appropriately.
Recent works have been conducted to select and config-
ure the best LPPM to use according to a set of objectives
set by the user in term of utility and privacy. For instance,
ALP [81] relies on a greedy approach that iteratively
evaluates the privacy and utility, thus refining the values of
configuration parameters at each step. While ALP can be
used for online and offline LPPMs, PULP [82] proposes a
framework allowing to automatically choose and configure
offline LPPMs. To do that, PULP explores and models
the dependency that exists, for different LPPMs, between
their configuration parameters and the privacy/utility
metrics that one wants to maximise.
F. Mobility datasets
To evaluate and compare protection mechanisms, we
need to assess their effectiveness on mobility datasets,
preferably including real mobility data of real users. To
this end, several initiatives have been conducted to pub-
licly provide datasets coming from real-life data collec-
tions. Table III lists some of the most common datasets
used in the literature.
The Cabspotting dataset [83] contains GPS traces of
taxi cabs in San Francisco (USA), collected in May 2008.
The Geolife dataset [84] gathers GPS trajectories collected
from April 2007 to August 2012 in Beijing (China). The
MDC dataset [85], [86] involves 182 volunteers equipped
with smartphones running a data collection software in
the Lake Geneva region (Switzerland), collected between
2099 and 2011. A privacy protection scheme based on k-
anonymity has been performed on the raw data before
releasing the MDC dataset. As described in [85], this
privacy preserving operation includes many manual op-
erations which have obviously an impact on the outcome
of LPPMs, but these impacts are difficult to fully under-
stand. It includes not only locations coming from the GPS
sensor, but also data from various other sensors (e.g., ac-
celerometer, battery). The Privamov dataset also gathers
mobility data from multiple sensors (i.e., accelerometer,
WiFi, cellular network). This data collection took place
from October 2014 to January 2016 and involves 100
students and staff from various campuses in the city of
Lyon equipped with smartphones [87]. T-Drive [88], [89]
is another dataset collected in Beijing and featuring taxi
drivers. It features a high number of users (more than
10,000) over a very short period of time (one week).
Other datasets come from geolocated social networks,
rather than from a custom data collection campaign ran
by academics. These social networks allowed users to leave
"check-ins" to places where they went, thus allowing to
build sparse mobility traces for these users. Two datasets
are available in this category, coming from the (now
closed) Brightkite and Gowalla [90], [91] social networks.
They contain 4 million (respectively 6 million) check-ins
collected between February 2009 and October 2010. These
datasets present a different kind of mobility data along
with relationships between users in the network.
Lastly, another approach is to use synthetic datasets,
i.e., randomly generated mobility datasets. Such genera-
tors include BerlinMOD [92], Brinkhoff’s generator [93]
and Hermoupolis [94]. Because they are generated, these
datasets may not always model very realistically the hu-
man mobility and all the hazards attached to it. However,
this approach allows to use datasets of any size, for
example to assess the scalability of algorithms to large-
scale datasets. Indeed, very few researchers have access to
extremely large datasets (e.g., the dataset with 1.5 million
individuals used by De Montjoye et al. [62] or the dataset
of 2.1 million individuals used by Wang et al. [67]).
Past experimental results have demonstrated that
datasets can have an important impact on the evaluation
of an LPPM. LPPMs providing k-anonymity are among
the most sensitive to this aspect. For example, it is far
easier to likely provide k-anonymity with an important
value of k with a large dataset than a small one. Similarly,
the sparsity of datasets will also be of high importance
in k-anonymous LPPMs, because this protection scheme
is particularly sensitive to the co-location of users (i.e.,
users being at the same place at the same time). From
one evaluation [32] to another [95] of the same LPPM,
results can indeed largely vary, due to the considered
(a) Trusted and Not Trusted Third Party (TTP
up, NTTP bottom) – Online
(b) Peer-to-Peer (P2P) – Online (c) Local – Online or Of-
fline
Fig. 4: Four different architectures can be adopted by LPPMs: Trusted Third Party (TTP), Non-Trusted Third Party
(NTTP), Peer-to-Peer (P2P), and Local.
datasets and their associated features. In the former case,
the dataset is generated using Brinkhoff’s generator, and
represents one day of mobility with 4.7 million events. In
the latter case, the real-life datasets Geolife, Cabspotting
and MDC are used, which contain between 11 and 25
million events, but scattered across several weeks or even
years. Another factor, besides the size of a datasets, is
the kind of users that it contains. Indeed, the taxi drivers
inside the Cabspotting dataset will likely have a different
behaviour that the ordinary people who are part of the
MDC dataset.
IV. Architectures of LPPMs
In addition to their different use cases, LPPMs can
leverage four different architectures. These architectures
are depicted in Figure 4. The local architecture is used by
both online and offline LPPMs, while the Trusted Third
Party (TTP), the Non-Trusted Third Party (NTTP), and
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) architectures are only used by online
LPPMs.
• The TTP architecture requires a trusted third party
proxy server. It means there is an external entity that
has access to the actual data coming from all users.
• The NTTP architecture still involves one or several
third party servers but they do not need to be trusted.
However, the LPPM is designed in such a manner that
this third party cannot represent a privacy threat,
even if malicious or colluding with the LBS. In this
scheme, the behaviour of the LPPM is usually split
and implemented on both the client and the proxy
server.
• The P2P architecture requires no external server, but
it requires users devices taking part in the system
to exchange information in a peer-to-peer fashion in
order to protect their data. Such LPPMs engage users
devices in a collaborative privacy protocol before they
send their data to an LBS.
• The local architecture does not require any commu-
nication with another party to protect data. LPPMs
entirely autonomous and process everything locally,
on the device on which they are executed (i.e., a users
devices or a server operated by the LBS). They may
need access to external databases, in which case the
latter are expected to be entirely available locally.
V. Location privacy preservation
In order to mitigate location privacy threats, LPPMs
have been introduced. Their goal is to transform mobility
data in order to protect it and prevent threats such as the
ones presented in Section II. As presented in Section I, we
distinguish between two main use cases of LPPMs: online
and offline. In the online case, the LPPM protects either
on-the-fly or by batch the mobility data before it even
reaches the LBS. In the offline case, the LPPM is applied
on an entire dataset before its publication.
In this section, we survey existing works about LPPMs,
and organise them into six categories. We summarise this
categorisation in Table IV and Table V for online and
offline LPPMs, respectively. Moreover, we indicate for each
LPPM its architecture and the categories of metrics that
were used to evaluate it by its authors. For the sake
of completeness, we distinguish in these tables between
differential privacy and k-anonymity for privacy formal
guarantees, and mention when an ad-hoc metric was used
to evaluate LPPMs. Ad-hoc metrics encompass metrics
that do not fit in our classification, usually because they
measure something that is unique to the considered LPPM
(e.g., something related to its algorithm and that cannot
be made generic to all LPPMs).
A. Mix-zones
Mix-zones are a concept introduced by Beresford and
Stajano. [144], taking its roots in the seminal work of
Chaum [145] about mix networks. The mix-zones model
TABLE IV: List of online LPPMs studied in this survey, with metrics used by their authors to evaluate them.
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Mix-zones
Beresford et al. [96] TTP X X
Freudiger et al. [97] TTP X X
Traffic-aware mix-zones [98] TTP X X X
MobMix [99] TTP X X X
Gong et al. [100] TTP/P2P X X
Generalization-based mechanisms
CliqueCloak [101] TTP X X X X
Casper [102] TTP X X
P2P cloaking [103] P2P X X X X
PRIVÉ [24] P2P X X X X X
PrivacyGrid [104] TTP X X X X
Xu and Cai [105] TTP X X X X X
Agir et al. [106] Local X X X
Ngo et al. [107] Local X X X X
ReverseCloak [108] TTP X X X X
Huguenin et al. [55] Local X X
Dummies-based mechanisms
Realistic fake trips [109] Local
Synthetic fake trips [110] Local X X X X
Kido et al. [31] Local X X
You et al. [111] Local X X
MobiPriv [112] TTP X X X X
SpotME [29] Local X X X
Kato et al. [113] Local X X X
SybilQuery [114] Local X X X X
Perturbation-based mechanisms
Geo-indistinguishability [23] Local X X X
Path cloaking [115] TTP X X
CAP [116] Local X X X
Temporal clustering [117] TTP X X X X
Location truncation [118] Local X
Bordenabe et al. [119] Local X X X X X
Oya et al. [120] Local X X X X
Predictive geo-indistinguishability [121] Local X X X
Elastic geo-indistinguishability [122] Local X X X
LocLok [123] Local X
PIVE [124] Local X X X X
Protocol-based mechanisms
Louis, Lester and Pierre [26] P2P X
PrivStats [28] P2P X X X
MobiCrowd [125] P2P X
C-Hide&Seek, C-Hide&Hash [27] NTTP X X X
SRide [126] NTTP X X X
PIR [127] NTTP X
Trust No One [128] NTTP
Narayanan et al. [129] P2P/TTP X
Koi [44] NTTP X
Zerosquare [130] NTTP X
Outsourced garbled circuit [131] NTTP X X X
Rule-based mechanisms
ipShield [132] Local X X
LP-Guardian [133] Local X X X
TABLE V: List of offline LPPMs studied in this survey, with metrics used by their authors to evaluate them.
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Generalization-based mechanisms
Nergiz et al. [134] X X X X
Never Walk Alone [135] X X X X
Wait for Me [32] X X X X X X
Yarovoy et al. [136] X X X
Differentially private grids [137] X X
GLOVE [34] X X
Gramaglia et al. [138] X X X
Dummies-based mechanisms
Realistic fake trips [109]
Synthetic fake trips [110] X X X
Hermes++ [30] X X X X
Perturbation-based mechanisms
Geo-indistinguishability [23] X X
Path confusion [139] X X X
PINQ [140] X
Chen et al. [141] X X X X
Jiang et al. [25] X X
DP-WHERE [33] X X
Acs et al. [142] X X
Riboni et al. [143] X X X X
Promesse [95] X X X X X
applies to mobile users communicating with LBSs, by
using a pseudonym instead of their real identity (e.g.,
real name, IP or MAC address). In this context, a mix-
zone is an area where movements of users are not tracked,
and consequently where users cannot communicate with
an LBS. When a user leaves a mix-zone, she receives a
new pseudonym chosen among the pseudonyms of users
inside the mix-zone. It means that when k users are
inside a mix-zone at the same time, their identities will
be shuffled, providing some of k-anonymity and resulting
in an attacker’s confusion.
1) Online mechanisms: The initial model was further
refined by Beresford and Stajano [96], providing a more
formal mathematical model as well as a location privacy
metric, from the point of view of the attacker. A question
that arises with mix-zones is where to place them. This
has been tackled by Freudiger et al. [97], with the goal to
maximise location privacy while taking into account the
negative impact of mix-zones on utility. Practically, they
use a new metric called mobility profiles to theoretically
compute the effectiveness of a mix-zone, and then solve the
mix-zones placement problem as an optimisation problem.
Another solution to the mix-zones placement problem was
proposed by Liu et al. [98]. They model the city as a graph,
where nodes are venues (i.e., places of interest inside a
city such as monuments, restaurants, cinemas, etc.) and
the road network is used to create edges connecting those
venues. On one hand, an LBS can have side information
on this graph and use it to re-identify users. On the other
hand, information about traffic is used to compute the op-
timal placement of mix-zones as an optimisation problem.
MobiMix proposed by Palanisamy and Liu [99] is another
solution leveraging the road network for optimising the
mix-zones placement. They consider the speed of users as
a side channel that could be used to re-identify them.
They also propose different manners to construct mix-
zones, designed to defeat timing attacks. Gong et al. [100]
proposed a socially-aware way to exchange pseudonyms.
They model the decision of changing a pseudonym as a
game, which takes into account social ties between users.
2) Discussion: Overall, mix-zones require an important
number of users to be effective. Indeed, if too few users
participate to the system, it is not very likely that they
will meet at any time during the day. We believe that this
critical mass of users is too important to make mix-zones
usable for individual users willing to protect their privacy
in online use cases. Moreover, mix-zones need to rely on a
third party to provide the pseudonyms, and a trusted third
party to handle the swapping of pseudonyms. Introducing
another trusted party, in place of the LBS, does not appear
to be a desirable property.
B. Generalization-based mechanisms
Generalization methods have been successfully applied
to provide k-anonymity in the location privacy context,
through the concept of spatial cloaking introduced by
Gruteser et al. [146]. Broadly speaking, the idea is to
report an coarser information instead of the exact location
of users. Besides the effect of reducing the precision of the
information, this also allows to create cloaking areas in
which at least k users are at any given moment.
1) Online mechanisms: Gedik and Liu introduced
CliqueCloak [101], which is a system generating cloaking
areas on-the-fly, as messages arrive, before sending them
to an LBS. Users specify a value for k, the maximum
size of the cloaking area and the maximum time between
the engine transmits the message to the LBS. Because
the engine needs enough messages to enforce k-anonymity,
messages can be delayed or cancelled if there are not
enough queries coming from the same area. Casper [102]
is a spatial cloaking architecture proposed by Mokbel et
al. It uses a location anonymizer (i.e., a trusted third
party) which knows locations of all users and their privacy
parameters (a k parameter and a minimal cloaking area).
When a user sends his query to the anonymizer, the latter
transforms it into a cloaked query and forwards it to the
query processor. The query processor needs to be able to
understand such cloaked queries. The response is then sent
to the anonymizer, which refines it by using the actual
user location and sends the final response to the user.
Chow et al. proposed P2P cloaking [103], which is essen-
tially an improvement of Casper. Like in Casper, users
specify a privacy profile with a k parameter and a min-
imal cloaking area size. However, instead of using a cen-
tral trusted anonymizer, a peer-to-peer protocol enables
nearby peers to generate cloaking areas. Clients can then
send themselves the query including the cloaking area,
instead of their exact location, to an LBS. PRIVÉ [24]
is a decentralised architecture proposed by Ghinita et al.
Instead of having a central server building cloaking areas,
a hierarchical and distributed index is used. This index
defines groups of at least k users in the same vicinity (i.e.,
cloaking areas). PrivacyGrid [104] is a solution introduced
by Bamba et al. focusing on speed and effectiveness. It
is an anonymisation proxy providing k-anonymity and `-
diversity thanks to a dynamic grid cloaking algorithm. It
allows users to specify individually their requirements in
terms of both privacy and utility. However, this LPPM
can fail to deliver a query to an LBS; the probability of
a query to be effectively protected can be increased by
allowing to delay its sending. Xu and Cai [105] proposed
a "feeling-based" approach to location privacy. The main
idea is that users specify their privacy requirements by
defining a public region that they would feel comfortable
to be reported as their location. The goal is to replace
traditional models in which users have to specify param-
eters, such as the k of k-anonymous LPPMs, which may
not be very expressive to them. The authors then propose
a solution, based on a trusted server, to build cloaking
areas matching such a privacy requirement of each user. Li
and Palanisamy introduced ReverseCloak [108], an LPPM
providing k-anonymity for users moving inside a road
network. This approach differs from previous work in that
it provides a multi-level reversible privacy model. It means
that different LBSs may have different access levels, and
thus access more or less granular information.
Agir et. al [106] introduced an adaptive mechanism to
dynamically change the size of obfuscated areas hiding
the exact location of users. More precisely, the proposed
solution locally evaluates the privacy level and enlarges
the area until a target privacy level is achieved, or the
information is too distorted (in which case the location
cannot be released). Ngo and Kim [107] proposed a pro-
tection mechanism trying to optimise the average size of
cloaked areas generated by Hilbert curve methods. They
define a new privacy metric for cloaking areas, relying on -
differential privacy. They explore a notion of identifiability,
quantifying the probability of an attacker to identify the
user’s location from the cloaking area, that help them to
choose a value for the  parameter. Huguenin et al. [55]
studied the effect of using generalization-based LPPMs
while using LBSs such as Foursquare [4] to leave check-
ins. Towards this end, they used a predictive model to
quantify the effect of generalization on perceived utility.
They were able to predict with a small error the loss of
utility caused by the generalization protection, allowing to
implement efficiently LPPMs featuring both good privacy
and utility properties.
2) Offline mechanisms: Nergiz et al. [134] proposed an
algorithm to segment trajectories into groups of points
providing k-anonymity. Then, they introduced a ran-
domised reconstruction algorithm that uses the cloaked
areas obtained from the previous step to recreate trajecto-
ries, giving a protected version of the original trajectories.
Abul et al. proposed Never Walk Alone [135], whose idea is
to guarantee that at every instant there is at least k users
walking at a given distance of the others, thus creating
cylinders within which users move. This radius exploits the
inherent incertitude that comes with GPS measurements
to avoid distorting the data too much. This mechanism
has been later improved by Wait4Me [32], which is more
generic with respect to the input dataset it can protect,
and scales better to large datasets.
When people move, they essentially move from one
place to another, which are often POIs. The list of these
places can been considered as a quasi-identifier, which can
be protected with a k-anonymity guarantee. Yarovoy et
al. [136] tackled the problem of creating optimal anonymi-
sation groups for moving objects, which unlike traditional
databases may not be disjoint. They consider an attacker
model where the latter is building an attack graph giving
relationships between objects in the protected database
and their identities in the raw database. Qardaji et al. [137]
studied the usage of grids to partition the continuous space
into a discrete domain. They started with static grids and
proposed a method to choose the grid’s size, and then pro-
posed a new approach using an adaptive grid. Gramaglia
and Fiore [34] proposed a measure of the anonymisability
of mobility datasets, based on their spatio-temporal simi-
larity. Then, they introduced GLOVE, an adaptive protec-
tion mechanism providing k-anonymity while reducing the
utility loss. It iteratively merges mobility traces that are
the most similar, with respect to the previously introduced
metric, until all groups of traces contain at least k users.
Gramaglia et al. [138] introduced kτ,-anonymity, which
is a model extending k-anonymity to include temporal
information. In this setup, an attacker may have some
background knowledge covering a continuous period of
time of at most τ , and is allowed to discover the mobility
records of a targeted user for a period of at most 
(disjoint from τ). The authors propose a way to reach kτ,-
anonymity by relying on a spatio-temporal generalization.
3) Discussion: Overall, generalization-based LPPMs
have the advantage to propose an easy to understand pri-
vacy model (e.g., k-anonymity). This category of LPPMs
is most adapted to offline scenarios with deterministic ap-
proaches. Indeed, providing different protected versions of
the same dataset with an non-deterministic approach can
reveal additional information at each release. Moreover,
as outlined with Wait for Me, these approaches faces to a
scalability issue when the size of the dataset increases.
In online use cases, this protection scheme suffers from
the same weakness than mix-zones, specifically the require-
ment to have enough users to be effective. In addition,
generalization-based LPPMs usually do not work with
GPS coordinates but with areas or trajectory which is not
immediately usable by existing LSBs.
C. Dummies-based mechanisms
Instead of relying on other users to be hidden among
them and obtain k-anonymity, as with generalization-
based approaches, it is possible to generate fake users,
called dummies. In this scheme, the attacker may be aware
that there are dummies inside the data it got, but the
challenge here is to generate realistic fake data, ideally
indistinguishable from the real data.
1) Online mechanisms: Dummies-based protection
mechanisms are mostly used for online usage in the lit-
erature. The basic idea is for each user to send multiple
queries to an LBS, instead of a single one. One of those
queries contain his actual location, while the others con-
tain fake locations. Consequently, the LBS is not able to
determine exactly where the user really is located. Kido et
al. [31] were the first to introduce a protection mechanism
using dummies. They simply split the space into regions of
a fixed size and generate dummies in neighbouring regions.
You et al. [111] proposed another method to create fake
trajectories. They generate endpoints randomly and then
generate trajectories between these new endpoints with
two methods. A first method generates a trajectory ran-
domly by using vertical, horizontal and diagonal random
speeds. A second method intends to force intersections
between trajectories of dummies and the real user’s trajec-
tory. In that case, a dummy trajectory is obtained by ro-
tating the real trajectory around a given point. Stenneth et
al.[112] presented MobiPriv, which uses an anonymisation
proxy through which all queries transit before being sent
to an LBS. Similarly to centralized protection mechanisms
presented in Section V-B, the proxy of MobiPriv ensures k-
anonymity by generating realistic looking dummies. It also
leverages a history of previous queries to prevent attacks
using the intersection of multiple queries’ results to infer
new knowledge. SpotME, proposed by Quercia et al. [29],
also generates dummies within discrete regions. However,
this solution is specific to one use case: counting users
inside regions. Users report to be or not within a region
according to a randomized mechanism. The LBS can then
"reverse" this mechanism and compute how many users
are really within a region with a high probability. If users
are honest, there is at most an error of 11 % in the final
result. Lato et al. [113] presented a method to generate
dummies that acknowledge the fact that users make stops
during their mobility, while previous work often consider
generating fake trajectories between two endpoints. They
assume user’s movements are known in advance and use
this knowledge to reduce user’s traceability (i.e., increasing
the confusion of an LBS about which of the dummies are
the real users). More specifically, each time the user stops,
there is a possibility that a dummy can stop at the same
place, thus creating a crossing between multiple paths and
increasing the confusion.
Shankar et al. introduced SybilQuery [114], a solution
to generate real-looking fake trips, especially suited for
navigation applications. Knowing the real trajectory that
a user will do, SybilQuery will generate fake trips starting
from and ending to different locations, but preserving
properties such as the length of the trip and the semantics
of the areas where endpoints are located (e.g., residential
vs business areas). When a user moves and sends queries
to an LBS to get directions, fake users will also move along
fake trips. Krumm [109] proposed a probabilistic model to
generate fake driving trips. Endpoints are chosen accord-
ing to some probability model. A route planner is used to
generate a trajectory between trips, with some randomness
injected into trajectory to prevent the optimal path to be
always selected (indeed, users do not always follow the
best path when driving). Speeds are also drawn from a
probability model, and some noise is finally added to each
point to simulate GPS noise. Bindschaedler et Shokri [110]
presented a way to generate synthetic mobility traces that
share statistical features with real traces in a privacy-
preserving way. These synthetic traces are designed to be
used instead of the real traces, thus presumably leaking
no sensitive information. They build a mobility model for
each trace and an aggregate probabilistic mobility model
about the entire dataset, and use it to synthetise fake
traces from these models; which must satisfy a privacy
test before being released.
2) Offline mechanisms: In an offline context, dummies
can also be used to provide artificial k-anonymity when
data would otherwise be discarded because there is no
other user with a similar behaviour, although it is less
used because it introduces an obvious error for analysts.
Pelekis et al. proposed Hermes++ [30], which is a privacy-
preserving query engine. It relies on the injection of dum-
mies in query results, these dummies being designed to
follow the behaviour of actual users. This engine also has
an auditing module that is able to detect if a sequence of
queries can be harmful for the privacy of individuals (i.e.,
if trying to track users over time).
3) Discussion: The main issue with dummies-based
LPPMs is their ability to produce real-looking dummies.
Indeed, a study of Peddinti et al. [147] showed that
SybilQuery is very vulnerable to attacks based on machine
learning. They developed an algorithm able to correlate
traces, and tested it against a dataset containing data
of 85 taxi drivers around San Francisco. SybilQuery was
configured with k = 5, which means that each mobility
event generated by a driver was hidden among four other
dummy events. In the case of an attacker having access
to a previous mobility dataset (i.e., forming the training
dataset), their algorithm re-identified 93 % of the users.
Furthermore, some of these algorithms (e.g., [114], [109])
use an extensive amount of external knowledge, such as
a graph modeling the road network, a route planner or
census statistics about the population. However, using and
processing important external knowledges in online use
cases represents a limiting factor for a usage on mobile
device with limited computational and storage capacities.
D. Perturbation-based mechanisms
While protection mechanisms providing k-anonymity
try to hide a user inside a crowd, other mechanisms rely
on the alteration of the data to be sent to an LBS to
protect it. In this case the challenge is to have a trade-
off between privacy (i.e., the data needs to be distorted
enough to be protected) and the utility (i.e., if the data
is too distorted, results from the LBS will be unusable).
Most mechanisms work by adding some (often random)
noise to the underlying raw data.
1) Online mechanisms: Hoh et al. [115] proposed a
mechanism playing with the confusion of an attacker.
They designed a privacy metric called time-to-confusion,
quantifying the duration for which a given user can be
tracked by an attacker. They developed an LPPM using
an third party server which aims to maximise this metric,
in the context of traffic monitoring. Pingley et al. pre-
sented CAP [116]. This solution protects two channels
by which a curious LBS could obtain information: the
location contained inside the query and the user’s IP
address. For the latter an improved routing algorithm
in the Tor anonymising network [148] is used, while for
the former Hilbert curves are leveraged to generate fake
locations close to the real one. Assam and Seidl [117]
proposed a mechanism enforcing k-anonymity through
temporal clustering of streams of mobility data. Micinski
et al. [118] studied the effect of location truncation, i.e.,
reducing the precision of latitude/longitude coordinates by
dropping decimals, on a nearby venues finder application
on Android. This is a simple protection mechanism that
can still be effective to protect someone’s exact location.
Differential privacy has been generalised for location
privacy by Andres et al. under the notion of geo-
indistinguishability [23]. Geo-indistinguishability is a for-
mal notion of location privacy that bounds the probabil-
ity of two points to be reported locations of the same
real location within a given radius. Thus, a user can
quantify the level of privacy she wants within a specific
area. Practically, it is done through the  parameter
(the lower , the higher the noise), resulting in -geo-
indistinguishability. Authors proposed a way to provide
geo-indistinguishability by adding noise drawn from a
planar Laplace distribution to a real location. Bordenabe
et al. [119] proposed a method to construct an LPPM
enforcing geo-indistinguishability that maximises the util-
ity. To achieve that, they relied on linear programming
techniques, and proposed a way to reduce the number
of constraints, this improving the time required to build
the LPPM. Oya et al. [120] also studied the design of
optimal LPPMs, including geo-indistinguishability among
others. They argue that, besides metrics based on attack
correctness, auxiliary metrics should be taken into account
when evaluating an LPPM. Consequently, they introduced
two such metrics, showed that one single metric is not
sufficient to assess the efficiency of an LPPM, and used
these additional metrics to design a new LPPM. Due to
temporal correlations between a user’s locations, differ-
ential privacy proposed in geo-indistinguishability can be
problematic because each time a location is protected,
some more privacy is lost. In other words, protecting a
trace of n locations with -geo-indistinguishability results
at the end in n-geo-indistinguishability. To overcome this
limitation, Chatzikokolakis et al. proposed a predictive
mechanism [121] providing geo-indistinguishably, using
prediction to avoid spending too much budget for each
location protection. With two different ways of spending
the privacy budget this gives a substantial improvement
over the original geo-indistinguishable mechanism. The
same authors also proposed another extension of geo-
indistinguishability [122], which leverages contextual infor-
mation to calibrate the amount of noise applied to disturb
the mobility traces. They consider two levels of sensitivity
if the user is located in an urban environment, where
there is a high density of venues around, or in a sparse
countryside area.
To account the temporal correlation of mobility traces,
Xiao and Xiong [149] also proposed a mechanism based
on differential privacy and a new measure to evaluate the
sensitivity of each protected location. The same authors
later proposed LocLok [123], an LPPM taking into account
temporal correlations via a hidden Markov model. In a
nutshell, their mechanism maintains a hidden Markov
model of possible actual locations each time a protected
location is released, and then generates protected locations
via a differentially private method taking into account
this Markov model. Yu et al. introduced PIVE [124],
whose goal is to enforce at the same time two privacy
guarantees: geo-indistinguishability and protection against
adversary attacks. Their solution works in two steps: first
a protection location set is generated from the actual
location and a minimum attacker error specified by the
user. Then a protected location, having differential privacy
guarantees, is generated from the protection location set.
2) Offline mechanisms: Hoh and Gruteser [139] intro-
duced the idea of path confusion as an LPPM. The idea
is to make closer users’ paths to cross when they are close
enough, to augment the confusion of an adversary about
which path belong to which user. They formulate and
solve this problem as a constrained non-linear optimisation
problem. We proposed Promesse [95], which is specifically
designed to hide the POIs of users. It works on mobility
traces by smoothing speed, i.e., making the speed appear
as being constant. Therefore, users seem to be always
moving, thus making it more difficult to guess were they
stopped and what their POIs are.
PINQ (for Privacy INtegrated Queries) [140] is an
analytics platform allowing to execute queries against a
data source while preserving privacy through differential
privacy. The data analyst writes his queries, specifies
privacy budget  that can be consumed, and the platform
automatically takes care of returning results satisfying
differentially private guarantees. One of the proposed
examples illustrates geo-located queries and shows that
PINQ can be successfully applied in this context. Chen
et al. [141] protected public transportation usage data,
which can be seen for each user as a sequence of places
(metro/bus stations) she went to. They built a method
to protect such data in a differentially private way and
evaluated their mechanism by studying the impact of their
protection on range queries and sequential pattern mining.
Differential privacy has been used by Jiang et al. [25]
to protect ships’ trajectories. Endpoints of trajectories
are preserved while intermediate locations are altered by
adding some noise satisfying differential privacy guaran-
tees. DP-WHERE [33] is a method introduced by Mir
et al. to generate synthetic Call Detail Records (CDRs)
in a differentially private way. They start by building a
model of real CDRs, formed of several histograms, and
then add noise to each of them to achieve differential
privacy. A synthetic CDR can be generated by using
the private versions of the histograms. Authors of geo-
indistinguishability [23] also presented an offline usage of
their protection mechanism. Acs et al. [142] proposed a
mechanism to protect spatio-temporal densities datasets,
which reports counts of active users within small areas
for given time windows. Such data can be obtained for
instance from call data records that are gathered by mobile
phone operators. The authors proposed an approach that
adapts to the original data in order to guarantee differ-
ential privacy with the highest possible utility. Counting
users is one interesting thing to do with mobility data,
but we want to publish entire trajectories and allow more
mining tasks to be performed. Riboni and Bettini [143]
introduced a way to publish check-in data (e.g., from
Swarm [150]) in a differentially private manner, with the
goal to allow venue recommandation from this data. They
start by filtering check-ins that fall within regions of fixed
size where a single user did too many check-ins, thus
indicating that it may be an important or sensitive venue
for him. Then, some noise is added to the number of check-
ins at each venue to enforce differential privacy, before to
release these statistical values.
3) Discussion: Online perturbation-based LPPMs have
the advantage to be working on a local architecture, i.e.,
they do not need an external trusted party, as opposed to
generalization-based LPPMs which very often require one.
A large number of them also rely on differential privacy
which can be performed locally. However, an open question
with this privacy model in an interactive mode (i.e., online
use cases) represents the management of the privacy bud-
get  (e.g., [151]). In addition, as the meaning of  is less
intuitive than the meaning of k (in k-anonymity), choosing
the proper value of this parameter may also be less clear
from a user point of view. Lastly, some perturbation-based
LPPMs do not rely on any formal privacy guarantee, which
makes their guarantees harder to justify in practice.
E. Protocol-based mechanisms
Protection mechanisms falling in previous categories
rely on the alteration of mobility data in order to protect
information. The solutions adopted in this category is to
propose protocols which preserve privacy by design. These
protocol-based mechanisms are generally more specific
(e.g., getting nearby friends, counting people) but can
achieve the best privacy guarantees. They largely rely on
encryption schemes offering strong privacy guaranties for
specific use cases.
1) Online mechanisms: Louis, Lester and Pierre are
three protocols proposed by Zhong et al. [26] that can
be used to locate nearby friends in a privacy-preserving
way. They are multi-parties protocols: a user, say Al-
ice, initiates a communication with another user, say
Bob, and tries to learn if she is within a given radius
r from herself. Depending on the protocol, Alice learns
nothing, Bob’s exact location, Bob’s exact distance or
Bob’s grid cell distance. On the other side Bob learns
nothing, Alice’s exact location and/or the radius r. Popa
et al. [28] introduced PrivStats, a system that can be
used to collect location-based aggregate statistics within
defined geographic areas. Users collaborate to send pre-
aggregated and encrypted data to the LBS, which allows
to hide the number of tuples and the time at which they
were collected. The LBS receives a constant number of
(encrypted) values at fixed time intervals, combines them
by using homomorphic encryption and asks a user to
decrypt the final aggregate value. Authors also propose
a privacy-preserving accountability protocol without any
trusted party to prevent clients from cheating. Mobi-
Crowd [125] is a protection mechanism designed by Shokri
et al. relying on collaboration between users to avoid
querying an LBS if the information is already available
on another nearby user’s device. Each requested piece of
information is stored inside a local buffer on users’ devices
and are given an expiration time. Users issuing queries
first broadcast it to neighbours in an attempt to get the
answer without contacting the LBS. Mascetti et al. [27]
proposed a protocol for proximity notifications of nearby
friends in a space divided into cells. Two protocols are
introduced in the article. With C-Hide&Seek, each user
sends to an LBS her current encrypted cell identifier, the
encryption key being shared between each pair of friends.
This way, users can learn in which cell their friends are,
even if they are not nearby. With C-Hide&Hash, each
user sends a hash of her salted location to the LBS, the
salt being the key shared between each pair of friends.
By computing the hashes of cells around and running a
private set intersection protocol with the LBS, users can
learn which friends are nearby, but not their distance.
Narayanan et al. [129] introduced another protocol for
testing the proximity of friends. They transformed the
problem from proximity testing to equality testing, and
then presented two protocols for private equality testing,
one using a peer-to-peer architecture and the other relying
on a trusted server. They finally introduced another solu-
tion relying on nearby location tags (e.g., WiFi broadcast
packets) detected by users, who may then run a private set
intersection protocol to infer their proximity. SRide [126]
is a privacy-preserving ridesharing system proposed by
Aïvodji et al. The goal of such a system is to prevent
the ridesharing platform to learn sensitive information
about the origin and destination of the users’ trips. They
leverage tools such as homomorphic encryption and secure
multiparty computation; the ridesharing platform is still
needed but do not have to be trusted anymore. Overall, the
SRide protocol can be executed in 5 to 9 seconds, with a
communication overhead comprised between 3 and 6 MB.
Private information retrieval (PIR), first theorised by
Chor et al. [152], is a schema allowing someone to retrieve
a row from a database without letting it know what
she wants to retrieve. Ghinita et al. [127] proposed to
apply PIR to N-nearest neighbours spatial queries, that
can be used for example to look for nearby venues (i.e.,
restaurants, monuments, etc.). They introduced a way to
index spatial information in a PIR-compliant way by using
Hilbert space-filling curves. Trust No One [128], proposed
by Jaiswal and Nandi, uses pseudonymised locations to
represent locations by an identifier without revealing ac-
tual coordinates and pseudonymised identifiers to repre-
sent entities by an identifier. These two pseudonyms are
generated by two different entities, respectively a mobile
operator and an LBS. Finally, a decentralized match-
ing service, that does not know anything about location
or identity of entities, has the responsibility to answer
queries. Koi [44] is a platform proposed by Guha et al.
It relies on two non-colluding servers, namely the matcher
and the combiner. The matcher knows about entities and
locations but nothing about links between them (i.e.,
which location belongs to which entity). The combiner
knows the mapping between entities and locations but
nothing about actual content of these entities and loca-
tions. A communication protocol between the matcher and
the combiner allows to answer queries by performing a
privacy-preserving matching. Instead of directly querying
Koi, mobile devices set up triggers reacting to some events
(e.g., getting notified when there is a restaurant at less
than 500 meters around me). Application developers must
hence create event-centric applications instead of location-
centric applications. Pidcock and Hengartner proposed
Zerosquare [130], which relies on two non-colluding servers,
one of them storing a user-indexed database and the
other a location-indexed database. Moreover, some cloud
components owned by service providers can be allowed
individually by each user to access data contained in the
location-indexed database. This is the mobile device itself
that queries the two databases and join information com-
ing from each of them. Garbled circuits where theorised
by Yao [153] and allow two parts to privately evaluate the
result of a generic function. Carter et al. [131] proposed a
way to outsource the evaluation of such garbled circuits.
Since they require a high computational power, outsourc-
ing their evaluation in the cloud allows to speed up the
processing and let a mobile device use garbled circuit
despite a low computational capacity. The challenge is to
preserve privacy guarantees even with an untrusted cloud.
As an example they implemented a privacy-preserving
navigation application that mainly consists in a Dijkstra
shortest-path algorithm used to privately get directions
between two (private) points while taking into account
(private) hazards that can occur along the path.
2) Discussion: Overall, protocol-based LPPMs exhibit
the best privacy and utility trade-off. This is because they
are tailored to answer more specific use cases, instead of
trying to solve a large range of use cases. But it also implies
that such approaches may be too specific, e.g., [129], [27]
are designed only to detect nearby friends. They also do
not interact with existing LBSs, because they essentially
replace them. While this gives to the LPPM designer much
more freedom, it may seriously slow down their adoption,
as new infrastructures need to be deployed to support
them. Moreover, because of the cost of the cryptographic
primitives, such approaches may still be practically un-
usable because of their algorithmic complexity which im-
pacts the execution time. For example, finding navigation
directions using outsourced garbled circuits [131] takes
about 15 minutes, and for a road network graph composed
of only 100 vertices.
F. Rule-based mechanisms
Some believe that one-size-fits-all protection mecha-
nisms are unrealistic. This is why some protection mech-
anisms implement various state-of-the-art solutions and
follow a set of rules to decide of the most appropriate
countermeasure to take in the current situation.
1) Online mechanisms: Chakraborty et al. proposed
ipShield [132], which is a framework, implemented on
Android, leveraging a rules engine to protect location
privacy. Users define which threats they want to be pro-
tected against, with a priority level. The system then
leverages a database of inference attacks to recommend
protection rules to apply on each sensor (i.e., not only
the GPS but also the accelerometer, the gyroscope, etc.).
Users can also define their own rules, using contextual
information and specifying actions to take on sensor data.
LP-Guardian [133] is a software running on Android pro-
posed by Fawaz and Shin to protect location privacy of
Android smartphones users. They designed a framework to
protect privacy against different threats: tracking threat,
identification threat and profiling threat. It uses a decision
tree to decide which action to perform in a given situa-
tion, leveraging the context (e.g., application being used,
location) and a combination of statically-defined and user-
defined rules.
2) Discussion: As rule-based mechanisms essentially
rely on a composition of LPPMs from other categories,
they inherit the associated pros and cons. Rule-based
mechanisms can cover a wider range of use cases, however
the side effects of these compositions can also jeopardise
the privacy protections.
VI. Open challenges
Although the literature in the location privacy field
is quite large, there are still several open challenges.
We present in this section some of them based on the
lessons we have learned from our experience. The first two
challenges are more research-oriented, while the three last
challenges are more technical
A. Quantifying location privacy
Evaluating the efficiency of a protection mechanism is
not an easy task. However, as it appears by looking at
Table IV and Table V, that there is a high heterogeneity
when it comes to the metrics used to evaluate LPPMs,
although it is possible to categorise them in a small
number of categories. This makes it very difficult to fairly
evaluate and compare LPPMs. We believe that an impor-
tant research direction is to be able to have a common
framework to evaluate LPPMs, by using a set of well-
defined and accepted metrics, across all three dimensions
of privacy, utility and performance.
Few works have been done in this direction. Shokri
et al. [36] were the first to propose a formal framework
to evaluate the efficiency of a protection mechanism by
using the impact of a location privacy attack. They for-
mally define three dimensions when evaluating privacy:
the accuracy, the certainty and the correctness. They
introduced different attacks and used their framework to
evaluate a few protection mechanisms. It is worth noting
that their framework is available as an open-source C++
tool [154]. However, this work is only applicable to a subset
of LPPMs, which fit into a probabilistic framework, and
is only interested in evaluating privacy. Later the ALP
framework [81] (available as an open source tool [155])
proposed a more generic support to configure LPPMs
from a set of privacy and utility objectives. However,
the number of available metrics and the definition of the
objectives are still somewhat limited, and the convergence
to appropriate configuration parameters is not ensured.
Those works both introduce a model and a number of
metrics to evaluate privacy and utility of LPPMs. Indeed,
despite formal guarantees are needed in most contexts,
they do not always translate well how an LPPM behaves in
practice, as it has been shown in several works (e.g., [156],
[157], [158]). On the privacy side, we advocate (similarly
to, e.g., [124]) that metrics relying on adversary attacks
should be considered as complimentary to the formal
guarantees. The emergence of data anonymization and de-
anonymization challenges [159] is promising to propose
new protection schemes and assess existing ones. On the
utility side, besides the classical information theoretic
metrics such as the entropy, there is a need to consider
more application-driven use cases.
B. Towards new protection mechanisms
Differential privacy has met a large interest and gen-
erated an important literature since its introduction in
2006 [71], [77]. Several recent works on location privacy use
and apply this approach for the protection of geolocated
information (e.g., [143], [121], [141]). We believe that
this privacy model is still promising and will continue to
generate an important literature in the next few years.
As noticed in Section V-D, how to manage the  privacy
budget in an interactive mode still remains an important
question. But besides its wide adoption and interest in the
research community, other guarantees are still worth being
used such as l-diversity and t-closeness. Chatzikokolakis
et al. [160] explore more in depth the deterministic (e.g.,
k-anonymity) and non-deterministic (e.g., differential pri-
vacy) methods that can be used to design modern LPPMs.
Another promising track of research concerns the com-
position of LPPMs (e.g., combining k-anonymity with l-
diversity where l < k). We previously classified such
approaches as rule-based LPPMs (Section V-F). These ap-
proaches rely on different LPPMs and use one or another
depending on the actual situation. Because there is no one-
size-fits-all LPPM, combining existing LPPMs allows to
cover a larger variety of use cases. However, quantifying
the guarantee offered by the composition of heterogeneous
LPPMs is challenging.
Yet another way to tackle the lack of a one-size-fits-
all LPPM, instead of composing existing LPPMs, is to
dynamically alter the level of protection offered by single
LPPM. Because not every data is equally sensitive and
needs to be similarly protected, such approaches bring
adaptivity. Dynamically adapting the offered privacy level
avoids over protecting data, and consequently provides a
better utility. This has been explored by some previous
works (e.g, [106], [122], [55], [81]). However, few of these
works take into account the semantics of visited places.
For example, it may be more important to protect that a
user went to a hospital than to protect that he is shopping
inside a mall. Providing adaptivity with respect to the
semantics of some place (Section II-B for more on the
semantics aspects) could be a smart way to provide users
with a tailored LPPM.
Recently, we have seen the development of privacy-by-
design approaches [44], [130]. Privacy-by-design has been
theorised by the information and privacy commissioner of
Ontario, Canada [161]. In a nutshell, it relies on seven
core principles: proactivity, privacy as the default setting,
privacy embedded in the design, full functionality, end-to-
end security, visibility/transparency and user-centricity. In
other words, it advocates for systems where privacy is
integrated since the beginning as a requirement and by
default, where the interests of the user come first, and
without sacrificing the quality of service. Despite seeming
utopian, this goal is actually reachable as soon as we throw
away the LBS stack as we know it today. With privacy-
by-design architectures, there is no need anymore to alter
mobility data, as the LBS itself integrates privacy as a first
class citizen.
C. Datasets
As shown in Section III-F, the research community
has at its disposal a few real-life mobility datasets to
evaluate its work. However, despite, several initiatives that
have been conducted to publicly provide datasets coming
from real-life data collections, all these datasets remain
small and involve a limited number of users. This lack of
large datasets strongly limit the ability of researchers to
test their solutions under real condition. Providing golden
standards in terms of large mobility data collections is
definitely appealing and would be very useful to better
compare LPPMs. There is a real need to share method-
ologies and tools around those collections, and make them
available to the research community. Some efforts are
already going into that direction, such as the Funf [11]
and APISENSE [10] platforms, or the Crawdad [162]
community. Lastly, open data initiatives followed by many
organisations and cities (e.g., the city of Montreal provides
trajectory data [163]) are also promising to provide open
and large datasets.
D. Users awareness
Most of the users are not aware about the risk related
to the exploitation of their mobility data. There is a lack
of tools to improve users’ awareness on this. To give an
example, Please Rob Me [48] is a website whose goal is
to "raise awareness about over-sharing", by showing it is
possible to infer from geo-located tweets whether users are
at home. Moreover, people are not aware of the value of
their mobility data, certainly because they do not know
the amount of knowledge that can be derived from it.
A study showed that people would share their mobility
trace in exchange of a little amount of money (the median
was £10 or £20 for a commercial usage in [164]) or a gift
(1 % of chances to win a US$200 MP3 player in [37]). We
advocate it is one of the mission of researchers to raise
awareness on societal problems such as privacy. Besides
talks targeted towards the general public, tools could be
developed to highlight privacy issues and the benefits of
using an LPPM. FindYou [54] is an example of such a
tool that allowed users to visualise what could be inferred
from the data collected by online LBSs such as Foursquare,
Instagram or Twitter. To go a step further, it would be
very interesting to additionally show the impact of an
LPPM on the collected data, and the benefits it brings
to users’ privacy.
E. Implementation effort
To be used, protection mechanisms obviously need to be
implemented and made available. Very few solutions are
freely downloadable and usable without reimplementing
them from scratch. A notable work is ipShield [132],
which is actually implemented on the Android platform
(though not necessarily installable trivially by end-users,
because it is tightly integrated in the Android kernel).
Geo-indistinguishability [23] has also been implemented
by its authors as a browser extension [165] working with
several popular browsers. This extension easily allows
users to benefit from some privacy when using geolo-
cated services through their Web browser. Another ex-
ample is Aircloak [166], a project that aims to propose a
trusted sensitive data collection architecture with privacy-
preserving querying capabilities. By using several layers of
noise, as well as maintaining a history of previous queries,
the application is able to detect combinations of queries
that could result in a privacy leak and prevent them. With
ACCIO [167], we proposed an experimental platform to
experiment with location privacy. This platform imple-
ments several state-of-the-art mobility data manipulation
routines, privacy and utility metrics, and LPPMs such as
geo-indistinguishability [23] or Wait4Me [32].
Lastly, we have also seen large companies taking steps
to actually implement privacy-preserving measures in their
products. Apple for example, uses differential privacy for
some machine learning applications [168], such as the
keyboard suggestions. Google also successfully integrated
RAPPOR [169] into its Chrome browser, allowing to get
usage statistics in a privacy preserving way. The latter also
relies on differential privacy, although it requires a large
number of users to behave properly (the experiments were
conducted with 1 million users).
VII. Conclusion
In this article, we surveyed the latest works about com-
putational location privacy. At the best of our knowledge,
it is the first survey to propose a unified view on both
online and offline protection mechanisms, and putting the
evaluation metrics as first-class citizens. This shows that
online and offline protection mechanisms can be based on
the same underlying primitives (e.g., differential privacy),
while providing appropriate algorithms suited for the con-
sidered use case. While literature is already rich in various
protection mechanisms, we outlined the lack of standard
methods to compare these mechanisms.
According to the title of this survey, there is still a
long road until location privacy can be democratised, both
politically (i.e., being accepted in the users’ mind) and
technically (i.e., having production-quality software). But
some recent theoretical and practical works are encourag-
ing and show the way to what future research in location
privacy could be.
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